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Perceptions of the appropriate response to norm
violation in 57 societies
Norm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation.
However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across
cultures and across domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience
samples of 22,863 students and non-students), we measured perceptions of the appro-
priateness of various responses to a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social
behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals and cultural variation. We find a
universal negative relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and appro-
priateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation, social ostracism and gossip.
Moreover, we find the country variation in the appropriateness of sanctions to be consistent
across different norm violations but not across different sanctions. Specifically, in those
countries where use of physical confrontation and social ostracism is rated as less appro-
priate, gossip is rated as more appropriate.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-21602-9 OPEN
A full list of authors and their affiliations appears at the end of the paper.









Norms, in the sense of collective ideas about approved anddisapproved behavior, exert a powerful influence on howpeople behave1. However, not everyone complies with
these norms, which may create dilemmas for those who witness
norm-violating behaviors and must decide whether to respond
with some kind of sanction. On the one hand, previous work has
suggested that norms encouraging informal sanctions are critical
to sustaining cooperation and social order in human groups2–4.
On the other hand, unfettered or inappropriate use of sanctions
may threaten social harmony by creating costly conflicts5,6. Thus,
cooperation and social harmony depend on norms about the use
of informal sanctions. Such norms about norm enforcement have
been termed metanorms7. Despite their importance, surprisingly
little is known about how metanorms operate in everyday life,
let alone across societies.
Existing research often examines and conceptualizes sanctions
in generic terms as a form of punishment that reduces outcomes
for another person8,9. While parsimonious, this characterization
is unlikely to provide a realistic account of how people deal with
norm violators in everyday life. To capture this realism,
scholars10,11 have recently proposed three distinct informal
sanctions: social ostracism (e.g., individuals or groups actively
avoiding someone), gossip (e.g., spreading information about
someone’s inappropriate behavior), and direct confrontation (e.g.,
verbal or physical). Although these responses may not always be
intended to modify the norm violator’s behavior, they can all be
viewed as expressions of disapproval that serve to strengthen a
given norm. A key reason that potential norm enforcers may
prefer one response over another is that responses may differ in
the extent to which the sanctioned party becomes aware of being
sanctioned. For instance, whereas direct confrontation should be
especially effective at making the norm violator aware of why they
are being sanctioned and thus change their behavior, gossip
should be less likely to evoke direct conflict but can still promote
norm compliance by making the norm more salient in the group.
Similarly, physical confrontation may be harmful in a way that
verbal confrontation is not. And social ostracism may directly
harm targets’ opportunities whereas gossip may harm targets
more indirectly via reputational damage. Prior cross-cultural
work has rarely distinguished between forms of sanctions, instead
focusing on costly actions that reduce outcomes for another
person in economic games12,13, physical confrontation14, or
unspecified “punishment”15.
To compare the perceived appropriateness of different forms
of sanctions across societies, we studied participants in 57
countries, including 7 African countries, 10 American countries,
18 Asian countries, 21 European countries, and Australia. The
study included 10 basic scenarios, mostly drawn from prior
studies of norm violations14,16. These stimuli covered various
domains of norm violations and included both animations and
verbal scenarios. One scenario described a violation of a coop-
erative norm regarding a common resource14. Four scenarios
described behaviors that were normatively out of place, such as
listening to music in headphones at a funeral16. Five “meta-
violation” scenarios described a potentially overly harsh response
to another’s behavior, such as someone responding to a verbal
insult by physical confrontation. For each of the 10 scenarios,
participants rated the appropriateness of the described behavior
as well as the appropriateness of four different responses to it:
verbal confrontation (making an angry remark to the norm
violator), gossip (talking to someone else about the norm vio-
lator), social ostracism (making a point of avoiding the norm
violator in the future), and non-action (doing nothing), for a
total of 10 × 5= 50 ratings.
The study, including the following five key hypotheses, was
preregistered with the Open Science Framework (osf.io/qg6xy).
Hypothesis 1: The more appropriate a triggering behavior is
perceived to be, the more appropriate it is to respond by doing
nothing and the less appropriate it is to respond by using con-
frontation, social ostracism, or gossip, and this will be consistent
across countries. The hypothesized negative relation between the
appropriateness ratings of norm violations and the appropriate-
ness rating of a response has previously been reported specifically
for verbal confrontation in the United States17. But we do not
know whether it holds for other forms of sanctions and across
cultures. This relationship is important for both conceptual and
methodological reasons. Conceptually, only a negative relation
would signify that that the sanction is indeed an expression of
disapproval. Methodologically, when comparing the perceived
appropriateness of a given response across societies, it is impor-
tant to control for the appropriateness rating of the norm viola-
tion as this may differ between societies. The four following
hypotheses concern the country variation in the perceived
appropriateness of informal sanctions: its consistency across
different norm violation domains, its specificity across different
forms of sanctions, its relation to variation in the use of informal
sanctions, and its relation to variation in other cultural and
societal factors.
Hypothesis 2: The country-level variation in the perceived
appropriateness of informal sanctions is robust across different
domains of norm violations. As metanorms are assumed to serve
the function of sustaining cooperation4, empirical work has
focused on norm violations with respect to contributions to, or
depletion of, common resources18–20. We will refer to this cate-
gory of norm violations as the “cooperation domain”. Impor-
tantly, many social norms do not belong to the cooperation
domain and may be more mundane, often just stipulating that
certain acts are not appropriate in certain contexts16. For
instance, it tends to be viewed as inappropriate to sleep in a
restaurant or to listen to music in headphones at a funeral. For
theorizing about the psychology of informal sanctions it is crucial
to know whether the cooperative domain of resource dilemmas
has a special status or whether the perceived appropriateness of a
given response is independent of the domain of the norm viola-
tion (holding constant how inappropriate the norm violation is
perceived to be). The present research illuminates this issue.
Previous work on verbal punishment of uncivil behavior does not
indicate any special status of the cooperation domain17,21, sup-
porting the parsimonious hypothesis that the psychology of
norms has a high level of generality that cuts across various
domains. Hence, we expected that the appropriateness rating of
the norm violation would be leading in influencing evaluations of
the appropriateness of the responses, in a manner relatively
independent of the domain of the norm violation.
Hypothesis 3: With respect to the specificity of different sanc-
tions we have three competing sub-hypotheses. Comparing across
different forms of informal sanctions, the country variation in
ratings of their appropriateness will exhibit either (A) con-
sistency, (B) complementarity, or (C) independence. As men-
tioned earlier, different forms of real-life sanctions seem to be
quite distinct, yet much prior work has used a unitary con-
ceptualization of sanctioning as payoff reduction. A unitary
conceptualization may be warranted if metanorms vary in the
same way for different forms of sanctions, such that some
societies view sanctions, in general, as more appropriate than
other societies. Another possibility is that all societies employ
sanctions but have different preferences for the form they should
take, such that a lower appropriateness rating of one sanction is
matched by a higher level for another sanction; for instance, it
could be that societies prefer either direct confrontation or non-
confrontational sanctions such as ostracism and gossip. A final
possibility is that different forms of sanctions serve different
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purposes and thus have little to do with each other, in which case
the appropriateness ratings of different sanctions would be
unrelated.
Hypothesis 4: In countries where a given sanction is more
viewed as appropriate it will also tend to be used more often. This
hypothesis constitutes a validation of metanorms. Just as norms
influence behavior, metanorms are expected to influence sanc-
tioning behavior.
Hypothesis 5: The perceived appropriateness of direct punish-
ment will be higher in countries estimated to have (a) lower on
indulgence, (b) higher on power distance, (c) lower on indivi-
dualism and individual autonomy values, (d) higher on tightness,
(e) higher on experienced threat, (f) lower on emancipative moral
judgments, (g) higher on pro-violence attitudes, (h) higher on
pathogen prevalence, (j) lower on gender equality, and (j) lower
on median income. All predictions were preregistered except the
last three (which theoretically connect to the other predictions,
see below).
To enable examination of Hypothesis 5, our survey includes
several culture measures that we aggregate to country level:
individual autonomy (valuation of independence and determi-
nation over religious faith, and obedience), emancipative moral
judgments (how justified it is with homosexuality, divorce,
abortion, and suicide), pro-violence attitudes, tightness (perva-
siveness of social norms and low tolerance for noncompliance),
and perceived threats to society (from disease, conflicts, etc.). We
also use data from other sources as follows. We use country
measures of indulgence (available for 48 countries in our study),
power distance (51 countries), and individualism (51 countries)
provided by Hofstede et al.22. We use country measures of
pathogen prevalence from prior work on the historical prevalence
of infectious diseases in different geopolitical regions23. We
measure national levels of gender equality by the Global Gender
Gap Index, which is calculated by the World Economic Forum
based on gender gaps in economic participation and opportunity,
educational attainment, health and survival, and political
empowerment24. From Gallup we obtain country measures of
median income (50 countries)25.
Note that the predictions in Hypothesis 5 focus on how the
perceived appropriateness of direct punishment (physical and
verbal confrontation) will vary across societies; whether the same
patterns or the opposite patterns will hold for indirect sanctions
like social ostracism and gossip depends on which of the sub-
hypotheses of Hypothesis 3 is correct. Our predictions on direct
punishment draw on theories of cultural dimensions, societal
tightness-looseness, and behavioral responses to the experience of
ecological threat. With respect to cultural dimensions, a cross-
cultural study found that responding to non-cooperation by
physical confrontation was viewed as more appropriate in
countries that were characterized by low levels of indulgence (i.e.,
restrictive of enjoying life and having fun, which a norm violator
may be viewed as doing), high levels of power distance (i.e.,
accepting asymmetry of power, which a punisher may be viewed
as wielding), and low levels of individualism (i.e., emphasizing
group embeddedness over individual autonomy, which a norm
violator may be viewed as expressing)14. In line with the role of
individualism, another study found verbal confrontation of
uncivil behavior to be more normative in less individualistic
societies21. With respect to tightness-looseness, there is some
cross-cultural evidence showing that formal institutions tend to
be more punitive in tighter countries3,16, and our prediction is
that this extends to informal sanctioning. Tight societies have
generally experienced more collective threat, and direct punish-
ment of deviants may be evolutionarily adaptive in these con-
texts26. By extension, the perceived appropriateness of direct
punishment is also expected to be related to the experience of
threat. The theory of behavioral immune system similarly traces
the origins of cultural differences to ecological threat, especially
pathogen prevalence, which is assumed to increase the need for
social coordination and thereby lead to cultures with less indi-
vidualism, greater power distance, and less tolerance of
nonconformity23,27, all of which suggest that pathogen prevalence
will also increase the perceived appropriateness of direct pun-
ishment. Finally, modernization theory ties the development of
cultural values to economic development. Specifically, increased
prosperity is assumed to facilitate a shift from traditional values
and community discipline to post-material, emancipative values
that include a greater emphasis on individual autonomy, gender
equality, and emancipative moral judgments28. Through a variety
of socioeconomic mechanisms, modernization is thought to
increase competition and complexity, and reduce inter-
dependence, thereby increasing prioritization of individual free-
dom, choice, and agency over conformity to the needs or
traditions of a society. It is therefore expected to be associated
with greater tolerance for a wide range of norm violations and,
consequently, a decrease in the perceived appropriateness of
punishing them.
In this study of 57 countries we find support for the five
hypotheses outlined above. Thus, we find a universal negative
relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and
appropriateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation,
social ostracism, and gossip. The country variation in the
appropriateness ratings of sanctions is found to be consistent
across different norm violations but not across different sanc-
tions. While the use of confrontation and social ostracism is
viewed as less appropriate in more prosperous countries with
more emancipative values, the opposite holds for gossip. Our
findings thus highlight both cultural universals and cultural
variation with respect to beliefs about how norms should be
enforced. Perhaps most intriguingly, our findings suggest that
responses to norm violators may shift with economic develop-
ment in a specific way, such that gossip to some extent is used in
place of more punitive sanctions, potentially affecting societies’
ability to achieve norm compliance.
Results
All appropriateness ratings were made on a six-point scale from
extremely inappropriate (coded 0) to extremely appropriate
(coded 5), which were standardized for each respondent to con-
trol for response sets. Throughout, numbers in brackets refer to
95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals based on
1000 bootstrap samples generated by SPSS v. 26.0. The sample
size for analyses is n= 57 countries unless stated otherwise.
Hypothesis 1. As preregistered, we tested Hypothesis 1 in each
country by calculating correlations, across the ten scenarios,
between country-mean ratings of norm violations and a given
response. The boxplots in Fig. 1 illustrate the results, confirming
that informal sanctions were essentially universally viewed as less
appropriate to use the more appropriate the norm violation was
perceived to be. This held for verbal confrontation, M=−0.77,
95% CI [−0.80, −0.75], gossip, M=−0.67 [−0.71, −0.62], and
social ostracism, M=−0.39 [−0.44, −0.34]. As predicted, these
negative correlations clearly distinguished sanctions from non-
action, for which the correlation was universally positive, M=
0.57 [0.55, 0.60]. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported.
Country measures of metanorms. Following our preregistration,
we calculated country measures of metanorms for each of four
responses (verbal confrontation, social ostracism, gossip, non-
action) by using country-mean appropriateness ratings for the
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five scenarios in the non-cooperation and out-of-place behavior
domains. These were adjusted for variation in ratings of the
appropriateness of the underlying norm violations (see “Meth-
ods”). Metanorm measures for all countries are reported in
Supplementary Table 2 and illustrated on color-coded maps in
Supplementary Fig. 1.
In the preregistration we assumed that metanorms for verbal
and physical confrontation would be the same, but recent work
has shown that they may be viewed quite differently10. We
therefore separately calculated the country measures of meta-
norms for physical confrontation by averaging the country-mean
appropriateness ratings of two meta-violation scenarios in which
physical confrontation was used in two different contexts: against
an agent depleting a common resource and against someone
insulting a man’s mother.
Averaged over all countries, the responses rated as most
appropriate were non-action, M= 2.67, 95% CI [2.63, 2.70] and
verbal confrontation, M= 2.61 [2.55, 2.66], followed by gossip,
M= 2.40 [2.35, 2.46], and then social ostracism, M= 2.02 [1.97,
2.07]. The lowest mean rating was for physical confrontation, M
= 1.80 [1.70, 1.90]; however, it is not directly comparable as it is
not based on the same set of underlying norm violations.
Importantly, there was no global consensus on the most
appropriate response. Verbal confrontation was rated highest in
26 countries. However, non-action was rated highest in the
remaining 31 countries, and in 17 of these countries the highest-
rated sanction was gossip. There was even one country (Thailand)
where social ostracism was the highest-rated sanction.
As a robustness check of observed country differences, we
found that differences in metanorms between cities in the same
country, as well as between students and non-students in the same
country, tended to be much smaller than the country differences
(Supplementary Table 3). Metanorm measures were virtually
unchanged in analyses that excluded participants who failed
attention or comprehension checks (Supplementary Table 4).
Hypothesis 2. As preregistered, we tested the robustness across
domains (Hypothesis 2) by examining pairwise correlations of
metanorms measures based on different sets of domains. Mea-
sures based only on the non-cooperation scenario correlated
strongly with the main measures for verbal confrontation, r=
0.79 [0.70, 0.87], social ostracism, r= 0.66 [0.41, 0.81], and gos-
sip, r= 0.92 [0.86, 0.96], and more weakly for non-action, r=
0.29 [0.05, 0.50]. Measures based on all 10 scenarios (i.e.,
including meta-violations in addition to non-cooperation and
out-of-place behavior) correlated very strongly with the main
measures, all r > 0.9. For physical confrontation we similarly
tested robustness across domains by correlating the main measure
with the measure based only on the scenario of physical con-
frontation against non-cooperation, r= 0.87 [0.81, 0.92]. In an
additional, unregistered, analysis we found generally high internal
consistency of country-level appropriateness ratings of a given
response across different scenarios (Supplementary Table 9).
Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported.
Hypothesis 3. Following the preregistration, we analyzed the
sanction-specificity of metanorms by calculating pairwise partial
correlations of the metanorm measures for different sanctions,
controlling for the metanorm measure for non-action (Table 1).
When interpreting these correlations, note that they will, to some
extent, be artificially lowered due to ratings being standardized.
Nonetheless, they present a very clear but complex pattern,
simultaneously including all possibilities discussed in Hypothesis
3: consistency, independence, and complementarity. Metanorms
for physical confrontation and social ostracism showed a high
level of consistency (i.e., were positively correlated), but were
largely independent of the metanorm for verbal confrontation.
Strikingly, the metanorm for gossip showed strong com-
plementarity (i.e., negative correlations) to the metanorms for all
other sanctions.
Hypothesis 4. To measure the frequencies by which various
informal sanctions are used in different countries, the survey
included three items where participants estimated how often they
use various responses to someone who does something inap-
propriate. As preregistered, we tested Hypothesis 3 by calculating
the correlations between the country mean for the frequency of
Fig. 1 Within-country correlations between appropriateness ratings of
norm violations and different responses. The vertical axis refers to the
correlation, across n= 10 scenarios, between the (country level)
appropriateness ratings of the norm violation and a given response to it. For
every response, the corresponding boxplot presents how the value of the
within-country correlation varied across n= 57 countries. Verbal
confrontation, gossip, and social ostracism almost universally yielded
negative correlations, while non-action universally yielded positive
correlations. The dashed reference line indicates a zero correlation. The box
represents the interquartile range with the dark line indicating the median.
The whiskers reach the min and max values in case these are at most 1.5
times the box height outside the interquartile range. Individual data points
are overlaid as dots.
Table 1 Partial correlations between metanorms for different responses.
Metanorms Physical confrontation Verbal confrontation Social ostracism
Physical confrontation
Verbal confrontation 0.14 [−0.18, 0.41]
Social ostracism 0.56 [0.36, 0.74] −0.27 [−0.50, −0.01]
Gossip −0.72 [−0.83, −0.53] −0.50 [−0.70, −0.28] −0.57 [−0.71, −0.35]
Note. Partial correlations are based on n= 57 countries, controlling for the metanorm for non-action. 95% confidence intervals are presented in brackets.
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use of a response and the metanorm measure for the same
response. As predicted, all correlations were positive: the use of
“confrontation” correlated with both the physical confrontation
metanorm, r= 0.49 [0.20, 0.70], and the verbal confrontation
metanorm, r= 0.40 [0.20, 0.58]; the use of “avoiding” correlated
with the metanorm for social ostracism, r= 0.49 [0.27, 0.68]; and
the use of “talking to others’ correlated with the metanorm for
gossip, r= 0.60 [0.41, 0.75]. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported.
(All pairwise correlations between metanorms and use of differ-
ent sanctions are reported in Supplementary Table 5.)
Hypothesis 5. As preregistered, we calculated the pairwise cor-
relations between our metanorm measures and the various
country measures mentioned in Hypothesis 5 (Table 2). For
physical confrontation, all correlations showed the predicted
direction. Particularly strong results (r > 0.50) were obtained for
power distance, individualism, individual autonomy, emancipa-
tive moral judgments, tightness, national levels of gender equality,
and median income. Results for verbal confrontation were weaker
and two of the correlations (for tightness and pro-violence atti-
tudes) went weakly in the wrong direction. Thus, Hypothesis 5
received support but much more strongly for physical con-
frontation than for verbal confrontation, underscoring the need
for making a distinction between these sanctions. Results for
social ostracism showed the same pattern as for physical con-
frontation. However, results for gossip followed the exact oppo-
site pattern. For example, the appropriateness rating of gossip was
higher in countries that were higher on individualism, autonomy
values, emancipative moral judgments, gender equality, and
median income. This opposite pattern for gossip is consistent
with our previous analysis of sanction-specificity of metanorms.
(Correlations tend to keep the same signs when metanorms are
estimated separately for non-cooperation and out-of-place
behaviors, see Supplementary Table 6.)
When drawing conclusions about the origins of variation in
metanorms, it is important to note that cultural, ecological, and
economic variables are often strongly intercorrelated (Supple-
mentary Table 7). Moreover, the strength of correlations between
metanorms and emancipative moral judgments may in part be
due to both constructs being based on appropriateness ratings of
actions. Among the other variables, median income and the
national level of gender equality tended to show the strongest
relation to metanorms overall. We use scatterplots to illustrate
that in countries where median income was higher the perceived
appropriateness of physical confrontation tended to be lower
(Fig. 2), while the perceived appropriateness of gossip tended to
be higher (Fig. 3).
Discussion
Although norms about punishing norm violators may be critical
for maintaining cooperation in human groups, there has been
Table 2 Correlations of metanorm measures with other country variables.
Metanorms for
Predictor Physical confrontation Verbal confrontation Social ostracism Gossip Non-action
Indulgence −0.21 [−0.45, 0.06] −0.15 [−0.38, 0.09] −0.24 [−0.43, −0.05] 0.37 [0.18, 0.54] −0.04 [−0.32, 0.24]
Power distance 0.69 [0.53, 0.81] 0.34 [0.15, 0.53] 0.36 [0.15, .56] −0.43 [0.64, −0.23] −0.51 [−0.69, −0.31]
Individualism −0.61 [−0.72, −0.49] −0.37 [−0.63, −0.04] −0.37 [−0.55, −0.20] 0.43 [0.21, 0.64] 0.48 [0.27, 0.66]
Individual
autonomy
−0.53 [−0.71, −0.31] −0.15 [−0.34, 0.04] −0.24 [−0.51, 0.05] 0.35 [0.11, 0.60] 0.39 [0.18, 0.58]
Emancipative
moral judgments
−0.76 [−0.84, −0.66] −0.22 [−0.46, .03] −0.54 [−0.72, −0.33] 0.54 [0.34, 0.72] 0.44 [0.21, 0.63]
Pro-violence
attitudes
0.35 [0.11, 0.60] −0.26 [−0.53, 0.09] 0.39 [0.07, 0.62] −0.12 [−0.36, 0.18] −0.12 [−0.42, 0.16]
Tightness 0.50 [0.27, 0.69] −0.05 [−0.29, 0.17] 0.37 [0.10, 0.61] −0.16 [−0.41, 0.09] −0.30 [−0.48, −0.08]
Perceived threat 0.12 [−0.14, 0.40] 0.20 [−0.08, 0.43] 0.04 [−0.18, 0.25] −0.04 [−0.27, 0.22] −0.36 [−0.58, −0.11]
Pathogen
prevalence
0.47 [0.25, 0.62] 0.28 [0.06, 0.50] 0.21 [−0.02, 0.42] −0.22 [−0.42, −0.02] −0.45 [−0.66, −0.21]
Gender equality −0.72 [−0.81, −0.61] −0.11 [−0.30, 0.10] −0.58 [−0.75, −0.37] 0.49 [0.26, 0.69] 0.29 [0.04, 0.50]
Median per-
capita income
−0.67 [−0.78, −0.54] −0.36 [−0.61, −0.06] −0.37 [−0.55, −0.14] 0.58 [0.40, 0.72] 0.45 [0.19, 0.65]
Note. Predictors come from different sources: measures of indulgence, power distance, and individualism are from Hofstede et al.22; individual autonomy, emancipative moral judgments, pro-violence
attitudes, tightness, and perceived threat were measured in the current study; measures of historical pathogen prevalence are from Murray and Schaller23; gender equality is measured by the Global
Gender Gap Index from World Economic Forum24; median per-capita income measures are from Gallup25. Correlations are based on n= 57 countries, except for indulgence (n= 48), power distance (n
= 51), individualism (n= 51), and median income (n= 50). 95% confidence intervals are presented in brackets.
Fig. 2 The negative association of median income with the
appropriateness rating of physical confrontation across 50 countries.
Including regression line (R2= 0.45). Every dot represents a country. The
x-axis represents median per-capita income according to Gallup24. The y-
axis represents the metanorm for physical confrontation, that is, the mean
appropriateness rating for scenarios where someone responds to a norm
violation by physical confrontation.
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little empirical research on which sanctions people in fact view as
appropriate and how this may vary across different norm viola-
tions and across countries. The first key finding of this cross-
cultural study of the perceived appropriateness of using informal
sanctions was culture-universal: the participants consider it more
appropriate to use gossip, social ostracism, and confrontation the
more inappropriate the triggering behavior is perceived to be.
This finding supports our assumption that these distinct
responses are all universally used as expressions of disapproval
and can therefore be conceived of as informal sanctions.
The next key finding was that metanorms for the different
sanctions were consistent within countries and largely indepen-
dent of the domain of the norm violation. Specifically, the same
rules for what is an appropriate response to non-cooperation
seem to apply to behavior that others simply find uncivil or out of
place. This finding is consistent with a parsimonious psychology
of informal sanctions that does not include any specific adapta-
tions for the cooperative domain. It poses a challenge for theories
of the evolution of cooperation, as it may not be sufficient to
focus only on the cooperative domain when modeling the evo-
lutionary dynamics of sanctions29.
Our study also contributed to the longstanding debate on
whether metanorms require punishment of norm violators.
Theoretical work on altruistic punishment has often assumed that
not punishing a norm violation is selfish and hence should be
deemed inappropriate30, and studies using economic experiments
have found that those who pay a cost to punish others' selfish
behavior are subsequently trusted more than non-punishers31,32.
However, studies have also found that non-punishers are not
viewed as more selfish29,33 and do not elicit more
disapproval14,18–20. Our finding that non-action was often viewed
as the most appropriate response is consistent with this latter
research, supporting the notion that metanorms often do not
require bystanders to punish norm violators. Note that this
conclusion applies only to relatively minor norm violations, as the
perceived appropriateness of non-action was found to decrease
for more serious infractions (Fig. 1).
When designing the study to include several forms of informal
sanctions, it was an open question to us whether different forms
would exhibit similar cross-cultural variation in appropriateness
ratings. We speculated that there could instead be com-
plementarity between preferences for confrontation and pre-
ferences for non-confrontational sanctions, such as social
ostracism and gossip. Indeed, we did find a separation between
societies condoning physical confrontation and societies con-
doning gossip—but, surprisingly, metanorms for gossip were
negatively correlated with metanorms for social ostracism, which
instead were positively correlated with metanorms for physical
confrontation. It was also surprising that metanorms for physical
and verbal confrontation were only weakly correlated. These
results indicate that metanorms are sanction-specific. This
interpretation was supported by the additional finding that
metanorm measures for distinct sanctions correlated well with the
reported levels of use of the same sanctions. Nonetheless, the
observed pattern of consistencies and complementarities across
different forms of informal sanctions remain intriguing puzzles
that require further research. We offer some thoughts below.
By relating metanorms to other country variables, our study
speaks to theories of how variation in metanorms may emerge.
One theory is that variation in metanorms reflects variation in
cultural values and norms; for instance, more individualistic
values and loose norms may give individuals more leeway in
violating norms without getting punished, while greater power
distance may raise the acceptance of individuals asserting
authority by punishing norm violators. Consistent with this
theory, appropriateness ratings of physical confrontation and
social ostracism were negatively correlated with individualism
and looseness, and positively correlated with power distance.
However, culture is not static. In a process thought to be driven
by increasing economic prosperity, cultural values have been
shifting quite rapidly in modern times, including increasing
autonomy for individuals, more emancipative moral judgments,
and less inequality between men and women34. Our study sug-
gests that metanorms are similarly shifting. Although the shift
itself cannot be observed in this cross-sectional study, we
observed high positive correlations of metanorms with emanci-
pative moral judgments, the national level of gender equality, and
median income. An alternative theory is that both cultural values
and metanorms respond to the local need for social coordination
that may be caused by conditions of ecological threat, especially
pathogen prevalence. Our data provided moderate support for the
role of pathogen prevalence, but no support for perceived threat
being related to metanorms.
Metanorms for gossip showed a unique pattern. In countries
with higher median income, gossip tended to be more, not less,
appropriate. Thus, if metanorms are indeed shifting as living
standards rise in the population at large, gossip appears to
become viewed as more appropriate as physical confrontation
becomes viewed as less appropriate. The specific rise of the per-
ceived appropriateness of gossip in countries with high living
standards is one of the most intriguing findings of our study.
What is it about gossip that makes its perceived appropriateness
change in ways distinct from social ostracism, which is another
non-confrontational sanction? One key difference is whether the
response is directed to the norm violator or a third party. Spe-
cifically, confrontation and active avoidance concern responses
that are related to how you interact with the norm violator; in
contrast, gossiping concerns how you interact with another per-
son. For this reason, people may think of both confrontation and
social ostracism as “punishment” while viewing gossip in a
Fig. 3 The positive association of median income with the
appropriateness rating of gossip across 50 countries. Including
regression line (R2= 0.33). Every dot represents a country. The x-axis
represents median per-capita income according to Gallup24. The y-axis
represents the metanorm for gossip, that is, the mean appropriateness
rating for scenarios where someone responds to a norm violation by gossip
(adjusted for country differences in the appropriateness ratings of the norm
violations).
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different way, even though they are all expressions of disapproval
and even though gossip may be as effective in sustaining norms35.
But why is gossip considered more appropriate, and “punish-
ment” less appropriate, in societies that are more affluent and
have more emancipative values? One possibility is that a decrease
in the perceived appropriateness of “punishment” in these
societies is compensated for by a complementary increase in the
perceived appropriateness and use of gossip. Gossip allows one to
examine whether other people share your evaluations and to
prepare for alternative forms of communication, such as public
messages that underscore a specific norm without singling out
any individual1. Second, gossip may be viewed as more appro-
priate in more individualistic societies because of differences in
social network structures; it may be viewed as less appropriate to
talk about a norm violator to someone who is socially close to that
person, which would typically be the case in collectivistic societies
where social networks are more overlapping36. A third inter-
pretation is that norms about gossip are less shaped by their role
for norm enforcement than by their role in free information
exchange, which arguably becomes more important as societal
complexity increases37.
Outside of lab experiments, we know of no data on the relative
effectiveness of different forms of sanctions for achieving norm
compliance. If some sanctions are more effective than others, the
country variation we have observed may cause varying levels of
compliance. This may be a particularly fruitful avenue of research
in connection with the social norms emerging in response to the
coronavirus crisis: Are violations of norms about social distan-
cing, say, more common (or less common) in countries favoring
gossip than in countries favoring confrontation?
Before closing, we should note some strengths and limitations
of the present research. Although we used only 10 different norm
violation scenarios, these covered a wide range of specific beha-
viors and contexts (e.g., singing in a library), supporting the
exciting conclusion that metanorms apply across behaviors and
contexts of the underlying norm violations, even though meta-
norms vary across countries. The scenarios were hypothetical, but
results were validated against the actual use of informal sanctions
reported by respondents. Finally, our sampling strategy had both
strengths and limitations. By collecting data from both students
and non-students, and across different cities, we established that
these subsamples tended to have similar metanorms in the same
country. However, it is possible that metanorms exhibit within-
country variation along the urban–rural and socioeconomic
dimensions, which we were unable to capture when focusing on
urban locations with universities.
A major contribution of the present research is the finding that
metanorms are not universal but are subject to systematic cross-
societal variation. Note that a lack of consensus about the right
way to deal with norm violators may contribute to conflict.
Disagreement about social norms is a fact of social life. As the
world becomes “smaller” and more interconnected, societies
increasingly face the need to consider and negotiate what is the
most appropriate response when one’s own norm is violated. It
also may make it more likely that one’s own norm-violating
behavior may elicit very different forms of sanctions. Both
experiences underline not only the scientific importance of
metanorms, but also how they may receive growing attention in a
world that faces opportunities for cultural diversity.
Methods
The study was preregistered at OSF (osf.io/qg6xy) at the start of data collection.
The full survey and the data used in the present paper are openly available at OSF
(osf.io/pm5kc/).
For comparability of samples, we set out to collect data from approximately 200
college students in a major city in each country, which was achieved in almost all
countries. To assess the robustness of the country-level measures obtained from
these samples, we complemented the main sampling strategy in two ways: (a) we
collected additional data from non-student samples (or, in two cases, part-time
students) in 31 countries; (b) we collected data from two or more student samples
located in different cities of each of 10 countries. In total, we have data from 22,863
participants (students: n= 18,091; non-students: n= 4772), after excluding a few
participants (1.5%) who reported an age under 18. Descriptions of the data col-
lection sites and their sample characteristics are reported in Supplementary
Table 1. Participants were recruited using a variety of methods, such as invitations
via email, on social media, in class, face to face on campus, using public notices and
flyers, and using survey organizations.
The survey was translated into 30 different languages, following the usual
practice of independent translation and back-translation. The study was conducted
anonymously online using Qualtrics, with a few exceptions. Part of the Estonian
non-student sample and the Ghanaian student and non-student samples were
collected using pen and paper at the university, with animations shown on a big
screen.
All participants gave their informed consent and we complied with all relevant
ethical regulations. Approval of the study protocol was obtained from ethics
committees and institutional review boards where required, including Queen’s
University (Canada), York University (Canada), Bogotá (Colombia), Institute of
Psychology at the Czech Academy of Sciences (Czech Republic), Universidad San
Francisco de Quito (Ecuador), United Psychological Research Committee (Hun-
gary), Monk Prayogshala (India), the Trinity College Dublin School of Social
Sciences and Philosophy (Ireland), Kwansei Gakuin University (Japan), Aoyama
Gakuin University (Japan), United States International University – Africa
(Kenya), Sunway University (Malaysia), University of Amsterdam (Netherlands),
Komisja ds. Etyki Badań Naukowych Wydziału Psychologii Uniwersytetu SWPS
(Poland), Instituto de Ciências Sociais (Portugal), Doha Institute for Graduate
Studies (Qatar), Singapore Management University (Singapore), Sungkyunkwan
University (South Korea), Universidad de Navarra (Spain), Post Graduate Institute
of Medicine (Sri Lanka), Chulalongkorn University (Thailand), American Uni-
versity of Sharjah (United Arab Emirates), University of Kent (United Kingdom),
Brunel College of Health and Life Sciences (United Kingdom), University of South
Carolina (United States), and New York University (United States).
Scenarios. Scenarios were selected to cover potentially norm-violating behavior in
three domains: cooperation, out-of-place everyday behavior, and meta-violations
(i.e., potentially norm-violating use of an informal sanction).
The cooperative domain was covered by an animation of an agent depleting a
common resource, referred to as scenario A. This scenario was drawn from prior
research on metanorms14.
Out-of-place everyday behavior was covered by four scenarios describing
someone (B) listening to music on headphones at a funeral, (C) sleeping in a
restaurant, (D) singing in a library, or (E) reading a newspaper at the movies. These
combinations of behaviors and contexts were found to be widely viewed as
inappropriate in a prior cross-cultural study of norms16.
Meta-violations included two instances of physical confrontation: (F) an
animation of an agent physically confronting someone who depleted a common
resource in scenario A, and (G) a verbal scenario with a man being physically
aggressive against someone who insulted his mother. We use scenarios F and G to
calculate metanorm measures for physical confrontation.
The remaining three meta-violation scenarios described someone who reacted
to a person who was rude in a public place in one of three ways: (H) by
reprimanding this person, (I) by speaking negatively about this person, or (J) by
staying away from this person.
Missing values. Missing values were handled by imputation, using the EM method
in SPSS.
Standardization. To control for response sets with respect to the appropriateness
response scale, the preregistered plan specified standardization of the participants’
mean response across all items, referring to the 50 items of the metanorm
instrument, which all used the same response scale from extremely inappropriate
to extremely appropriate. Notably, in addition to the metanorm instrument, the
survey included various other items that used different response scales to measure
how often something happens or how strongly the respondent agrees with a
statement, etc. All 50 appropriateness ratings of a participant were adjusted by a
constant equal to the grand mean of all appropriateness ratings in the entire sample
minus the mean of all appropriateness ratings by that participant. Thus, ratings
were raised for participants who had tended to use lower ratings than the average
participant, while ratings were lowered for participants who had tended to use
higher ratings than the average participant. The standardized ratings have the
property that the mean rating across the 50 appropriateness items is identical for
every participant (and identical to the grand mean of the original ratings across the
entire sample).
When interpreting results based on standardized ratings, we account for the fact
that standardization leads to some artificial negative effects on correlations between
different appropriateness items (i.e., items that are in fact uncorrelated will, after
standardization, tend to become slightly negatively correlated). Below we also
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consider an additional standardizing method that was not preregistered:
standardizing metanorm measures for sanctions by subtracting the metanorm
measure for non-action.
Calculation of metanorm measures. As specified in the preregistered analysis
plan, metanorm measures were obtained by adjusting county mean ratings for a
given response (verbal confrontation, social ostracism, gossip, or non-action) by
controlling for individual appropriateness ratings of the underlying norm viola-
tions. The technical specification is as follows.
Let Ns,c,i denote the appropriateness rating of the norm violation in scenario s
given by individual i in country c (centered on the global mean). Let Ns,c denote the
average value of Ns,c,i over all respondents from country c. Let Rs,c,i denote the
appropriateness of the given response in scenario s as rated by individual i in
country c. Then the metanorm measure in country c, denoted by Rc, is calculated by
estimating the multi-level model
Rs;c;i ¼ Rc þ b1Ns;c þ b2Ns;c;i þ ec;i þ es;c;i; ð1Þ
where the terms b1Ns,c+ b2Ns,c,i adjust for the appropriateness rating of the norm
violation at country- and individual level, ec,i is a random effect at the individual
level, and es,c,i is the residual error term.
Scenarios A–E were used in the main estimation. However, other sets of
scenarios may be used instead. Robustness checks reported in the main text
included basing metanorm measures on the set of all ten scenarios (A–J) as well as
only on scenario A. Note that when a single scenario is used, the country-level term
b1Ns,c becomes redundant and the multi-level model reduces to a simple linear
regression.
Culture measures. The survey included the following culture measures.
Hofstede scales. Four-item scales for individualism, power distance, and indulgence
(12 items in total) from the Hofstede VSM 2013 questionnaire. Country-mean
responses showed all three scales had poor internal consistency, all α < 0.30, so they
are not used.
Use of informal sanctions. Single items on participants’ own use of confrontations,
gossip, and avoidance (e.g., “How often does someone confront you for doing
something inappropriate?” and “How often do you confront someone who does
something inappropriate?”), and on participants’ perceptions of others’ use of these
sanctions against themselves (e.g., “How often does someone confront you for
doing something inappropriate?”), on a five-point scale from “never” (1) to
“always” (5). We use the country-mean responses.
Individual autonomy. We use a measure of cultural values on individual autonomy
adopted from the World Values Survey (WVS). Participants are asked to select up
to five important qualities for children to learn at home, from a list of 10 qualities.
Among the potential alternatives are independence, determination/perseverance,
religious faith, and obedience. As in the WVS, the autonomy measure (ranging
from −2 to +2) was calculated by the formula Autonomy= Independence+
Determination – Faith –Obedience, where qualities are coded 1 if selected, 0
otherwise. At the country level this measure had adequate internal consistency (α
= 0.75).
Emancipative moral judgments. We use a four-item scale adopted from the WVS,
asking how justified it is with homosexuality, divorce, abortion, and suicide, on a
scale from never justified (0) to always justified (10). Country-level internal con-
sistency was very good (α= 0.92).
Pro-violence attitudes. We similarly use two items adopted from the WVS, asking
how justified it is for a man to beat his wife and to use violence against other people
(α= 0.78).
Tightness. We use Gelfand’s 6-item tightness scale16, with items like “There are
many social norms that people are supposed to abide by in this country.” In the
original study, responses were standardized by subtracting participants’ mean
response to all items in the survey, which was strongly dominated by items on the
appropriateness of various behaviors in various contexts. Following this procedure,
we adjusted the responses to the tightness items in our survey by subtracting
participants’ mean response to all appropriateness items. Country-level internal
consistency was good (α= 0.80).
Perceived threat. To measure perceived threat we included a question original to
this study: “Which of the following do you think are threats to your society (tick
any that apply): conflict within the country, conflict with other countries, immi-
gration, over-population, food deprivation, lack of safe water, poor quality of air,
natural disasters, diseases?”. A tick for a given threat was coded as 1, no tick as zero.
Country-means had good internal consistency (α= 0.89).
Attention and comprehension. Measures of attention and comprehension were
included at the end of the survey. The attention test asked the participant to tick
the fourth box out of five. The comprehension test asked the participant how easy
or difficult it had been to understand the questions in the survey, on a five-point
scale from very difficult to very easy. In the robustness check reported in the main
text we excluded participants who had not answered one or both of these questions
(21.1%), or ticked the wrong box in the attention test (an additional 1.0%), or
answered that it was very difficult to understand the survey (an additional 0.4%).
Changes to the preregistered analyses. The present paper presents the pre-
registered analyses with the following three changes.
Exclusions. No exclusions were planned, but as the study was meant to target
adults, we decided to exclude respondents who stated an age below 18 years.
Measures of indulgence, power distance, and individualism. Because these scales
turned out to lack adequate reliability, we instead decided to use the official
Hofstede Insights country scores (obtained from www.hofstede-insights.com/
product/compare-countries/) for these cultural dimensions. Although still widely
used in research, a drawback is that these country scores typically build on data
collected long ago, especially for power distance and individualism, and may not
reflect recent cultural changes38.
The use of informal sanctions. To measure the use of informal sanctions, we decided
to focus on participants’ reports of own use of sanctions and disregard their per-
ceptions of how often they were sanctioned by others, as it is unlikely that people
have accurate perceptions of how much others avoid them or gossip about them.
Unregistered analyses. The main text describes some elements that were not
preregistered: inclusion of pathogen prevalence, median income, and the national
level of gender equality as correlates in Hypothesis 5; calculation of metanorms for
physical confrontation; robustness of metanorms across different cities and across
student and non-students; internal consistency of a metanorm across scenarios;
robustness of correlations with other variables whether metanorms are estimated in
the domain of non-cooperation or the domain of out-of-place behaviors. As an
additional unregistered analysis, metanorms for informal sanctions were standar-
dized by the metanorm for non-action. Specifically, subtraction of the metanorm
for non-action from the metanorms for sanctions was carried out to yield a
measure of how appropriate the sanction is perceived to be relative to doing
nothing at all. This method has the drawback that ratings for non-action exhibit
meaningful country variation (as seen in Table 2), which will be incorporated in the
measures for every sanction, thereby making them artificially more closely inter-
correlated. Nonetheless, the pattern of results for how metanorms vary across
cultures remains qualitatively the same (see Supplementary Table 8).
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
All data and materials are available at OSF (https://osf.io/pm5kc/), including the raw data
underlying Figs. 1–3 and SPSS syntax for analyses. A reporting summary for this Article
is available as a Supplementary Information file. Source data are provided with
this paper.
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